

Working Paper CEsA CSG 153 / 2017

EXPECTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF JAPAN'S 'NEW' ODA CHARTER FOR LUSOPHONE AFRICA UNDER TICAD PROCESS¹

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Abstract

This paper compares and asks how Japan's 'new' ODA Charter is influencing the direction of its aid policy to Lusophone Africa - so-called Portuguese-speaking African Countries of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe (PALOP) - in light of the TICAD process. The topic relates to Japan's shift from traditional humanitarian and development ODA towards a more strategic agenda on behalf of the private sector, which in turn requires us to assess how the latest Development Cooperation Charter compared to previous ones and how it reflects each of them. This paper finds that although the 'new' Charter benefits both sides it openly favors resource-rich Angola and Mozambique at the expense of development in the poorest PALOP. It concludes that Japan's public-private partnerships are playing a transformative role in PALOP in line with TICAD and the Africa Mining Vision, moving beyond the simple exploitation of natural resources towards broad-based sustainable growth.

Keywords Africa, Charter, Development, Japan, ODA, PALOP, Resources, TICAD

¹ Acknowledgments: I am thankful to Professors Yoneyuki Sugita from the Graduate School of Language and Culture, Osaka University for the travel fellowship and to Marie Söderberg, Director of the European Institute of Japanese Studies at Stockholm School of Economics for the invitation to attend the International Conference 'Development Cooperation in a Post-MDG Era: Can Japan Effectively Continue to Contribute Towards Global Development?', held on November 1-2, 2015, without which I could not have attended the Conference.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade global political stability and economic reforms in Lusophone Africa have increased Japan's availability, through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), to help the group of five Portuguese-speaking African Countries (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, PALOP: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe (hereafter, São Tomé) to achieve economic and social transformation for inclusive and sustained growth.

It follows that all five countries, which became independent from Portugal in 1974, suffer from acute poverty and face severe human security problems resulting from post-conflict state-building in the case of Angola and Mozambique and state fragility in the case of Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé. Cape Verde is the only one to have achieved the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Cape Verde is also the least affected by governance problems. However, like São Tomé and Guinea-Bissau it has Small Island Development State (SIDS) status meaning all five countries apart from Angola are highly dependent on foreign aid.

While Japan's allocation of ODA may be based on the recipients' development needs, there are other factors such as the vast natural resources of Angola and Mozambique and the fishery stocks of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé, but also their geopolitical importance and economic potential as a trade and energy bloc within the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, the CPLP).

This paper suggests a broader use of assistance other than ODA in tandem with Japanese and African interests.

With the approval of Japan's 'new' ODA Charter on February 10, 2015 renamed the 'Development Cooperation Charter', this hypothesis gains strength as the Charter clearly states that "in light of Japan's current economic and social situation, deepening its cooperative relations (...) with emerging and developing countries are the keys to its own sustainable prosperity", which "will also lead to ensuring Japan's national interests".¹

With half of the world's people living in a fragile situation there is increasing debate in the media about the implications of Japan's 'new' Charter for development assistance. The problem relates to Japan's shift from traditional humanitarian and development ODA toward a more strategic agenda on behalf of the private sector, which in turn requires us to assess how the 'new' Charter affects each of the PALOP countries.

In mid-2011, Japan replaced some of its lost nuclear-generated power with low-sulfur, heavy crude from sources in Angola, Gabon and Nigeria; in 2014 Japan was the third-largest net importer of total crude oil and petroleum products in the world after the United States (US) and China.²

One asks what influence this Charter has on the direction of Japan's aid to PALOP in light of the TICAD process that links both Japan's public and private interests with recipients' developmental and conflict-affected needs. It follows that TICAD is currently the best partnership mechanism for Japan to cooperate in a South-South context with PALOP or any other African country.³ Like the 'new' Charter which explicitly excludes ODA as the preferred instrument for eradicating poverty through 'quality' growth, TICAD has also long

advocated the promotion of private sector activities as a complement to ODA to achieve the above ends. Further, given that TICAD has broadened Japan's African diplomacy to include all countries independent of their size, development and conflict status, TICAD is currently Japan's most important diplomatic and aid policy tool for creating comprehensive aid programs ranging from social and economic infrastructures to public health, medical care, agriculture, conflict prevention and post-conflict development, trade and investment activities.⁴ Hence the main line of analysis of Japan's foreign aid policy to Africa extends beyond ODA as there is no explicit distinction between Japan's assistance for Africa 'with' and 'without' TICAD.⁵

Whether the TICAD partnership is effective depends on whether it can serve both sides equally (Japan and PALOP), while fostering inclusive growth for all partners. Besides fisheries and mineral resources-related capacities, some PALOP countries do boast the conditions required to develop not only large-scale agricultural production but also the production of biofuel from non-food crop raw materials such as sugarcane - biofuel that could be produced without putting pressure on the country's food security.⁶

Here, Japan's triangular cooperation (TrC) model, which refers to support for South-South cooperation (SSC) initiatives, provides an alternative to the so-called 'land-grab' malady that is affecting the ProSAVANA project. Japan is changing TrC by engaging the private sector in the development process as a responsible development actor, increasing the chances of PALOP attaining specific Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly goals 1 (ending poverty), 2 (ending hunger, achieving food security and promoting sustainable agriculture), 3 (ensuring healthy lives), 9 (building resilient infrastructure,

promoting inclusive and sustainable industrialization and fostering innovation), and 17 (revitalizing the global partnership for sustainable development, including SSC and TrC).

One argues that the broader scope of Japan's 'new' Charter with the inclusion of 'small island countries' is benefiting the poorer Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and the wealthier Angola and Mozambique and Japan in a 'win-win' partnership.⁷ The question is whether Japan's aid to PALOP translates into 'sustainable quality growth' and 'poverty eradication through such growth' to address 'global challenges' with regards the Post-2015 Development Agenda as the Charter writes.⁸

LITERATURE REVIEW

The few studies of Japan's development cooperation with PALOP have mostly focused on Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, Carvalho analyzed Japan's trade and investment relations with PALOP under Portuguese colonialism.⁹ Seabra reviewed Japan's aid and trade relations with PALOP after TICAD-IV,¹⁰ and Carvalho compared China and Japan's foreign aid policies and development modes to Lusophone Africa in the post-2000 period.¹¹ Among other findings, a common conclusion is that a major goal of Japan's economic cooperation has always been to secure a long-term supply of strategic resources. Available literature does not take into consideration the implications of Japan's latest Development Cooperation Charter to PALOP in light of TICAD, which increases its relevance.

METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE

This article explores the common identity of the five PALOP members within their geographical, economic and development diversity. It investigates both the policy and development effects of Japan's assistance under the 'new' Charter and TICAD. It also examines the expectations and implications of Japan's associate observer status at the CPLP with Lusophone Africa as a counterweight to China's engagement in PALOP. The paper is structured as follows: After the introduction, Section Two contextualizes Japan's development relations with PALOP post-independence. Section Three considers TICAD's development, economic and political connections with PALOP before and after the 'new' Charter. Section Four examines the role of Japanese public-private partnerships (PPP) in enhancing broad-based sustainable growth, reviews Japanese aid flows to PALOP and, based on Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA) *Ex. Post* and *Ex. Ante* Evaluations, presents the findings of 17 projects through qualitative methodology. Finally, it analyzes alternative strategies for coping with extractive resources maladies, food security and renewable energy sources. It concludes with an overview of the paper's key findings.

1. THE PALOP WORLD AND THE SHIFT IN JAPAN'S AID POLICY

When the Cold War ended the PALOP's socialist commitment weakened as members moved to multi-party politics following independence between 1973 and 1975.¹²

However, their transition to democracy was not peaceful; PALOP conflict-affectedness demanded a mixed strategy of development and security. Japan's diplomacy was 'forced' to align with the international normative regime.

At the 1991 DAC High-Level Meeting, Japan and other members agreed that human rights, democratization, accountability, the rule of law and a reduction of military expenditure were crucial to promoting good governance and sustainable development. In 1992, Japan's first ODA Charter matched the above principles and TICAD began applying them from 1993 onward. Japan's contribution to Angola and Mozambique's elections and peace processes in 1992 and 1993-95 respectively strengthened Japan's non-military development cooperation through peacebuilding institutionalized at TICAD-III in 2003,¹³ presently applied in Guinea-Bissau. Despite the development needs of Cape Verde (CPV), Guinea-Bissau (GBS) and São Tomé and Príncipe (STP) their transition to multi-party elections in 1991 and market-oriented economy was not enough to attract Japanese ODA.

Japan's Associate Observer Status at the CPLP: increasing expectations

The 'new' Charter states that Japan will cooperate, taking advantage of its strengths through public-private partnerships. At the tenth CPLP summit in Dili, East Timor in 2014, with the support of Portugal, Japan gained associate observer status. As a result, Shinzo Abe, Japanese Prime Minister (hereafter, PM), stated that Japan would cooperate in the progress of member countries through the CPLP.¹⁴ Both sides agreed to further promote contact between Japanese firms and the CPLP's business confederation, aimed at developing an economic dimension and business cooperation within the organization, and the signing of new partnership agreements towards the eradication of poverty, the promotion of inclusive

trade and sustainable development.¹⁵ According to Japan's 'new' Charter these partnerships are expected to lead to economic growth and poverty reduction in partner countries. Japan's associate observer status at the CPLP not only increases its trade expectations in a market of 230 million people spread across four continents, but also offers a source of primary commodities and political and diplomatic soft power against China's increasingly economic and institutional ties with the CPLP through the Macau Forum.¹⁶

One should note that since 1996 when the CPLP (PALOP in Africa) was created it has grown from a cultural union to a geopolitical and economical community. This fact explains Japan's growing interest as gas and oil from Angola, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé represent more than 30% of global hydrocarbon production, equivalent to the current production in the Middle East. This means that the CPLP will be a major energy protagonist and future trade bloc on the international scene.¹⁷

2. TICAD's CONNECTIONS WITH PALOP BEFORE AND AFTER THE 'NEW' CHARTER

The preceding section reviewed the background of PALOP and focused on the expectations Japan created with its associate observer status at the CPLP. This section examines the changes the 'new' Charter brings to TICAD diplomacy, reviews Japan's aid policy to PALOP since its inception, and then explores **the relevance of TICAD for PALOP.**

The ODA Charters

Following the launch of the ODA Charter of 1992, which referred to Africa as a region for which it was ‘necessary to be mindful of the poverty and the economic difficulties’, the revised Charter of 2003 emphasized the importance of increasing ODA for peacebuilding ends such as demining, economic reconstruction and social rehabilitation from a human security perspective¹⁸, which explains why Angola and Mozambique would become such important countries to TICAD.¹⁹ In contrast with previous charters the ‘new’ one explicitly puts TICAD at the center of Japan’s development assistance and emphasizes that ‘Japan will continue to actively engage in assistance for peacebuilding and assistance to fragile states from the perspective of human security’.²⁰ It is worth mentioning that TICAD diplomacy also differs from Japan’s previous African diplomacy as it not only called the world’s attention to the challenges of development in Africa, but it also made Angola and Mozambique priority countries as they reflected Japan’s basic human security and peacebuilding policies enacted in the last two charters and the TICAD process.²¹

The political, diplomatic and economic-resource relevance of Angola and Mozambique to the TICAD process since its inception contrasts with the irrelevance of Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé. This began to change between the fourth and fifth TICADs in 2008 and 2013 respectively. Furthermore, the focus of TICAD-IV on the MDGs rendered the progress made by Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and in particular, Cape Verde more relevant to the TICAD process itself. This, combined with several events in the countries under review and Japan’s wish to join the CPLP, seems to have contributed to increasing aid flows to PALOP.²²

Finally, in terms of Japan's foreign aid policy, the latest Charter presents two gains. Firstly, it introduces the notion of 'quality growth', or growth that is inclusive, sustainable and resilient, and complements TICAD-V's three pillars (first, a robust and sustainable economy; second, an inclusive and resilient economy; third, peace and stability). Secondly, it openly states the importance of 'ensuring Japan's national interests', which the previous ODA Charters of 1992 and 2003 did not.

The relevance of TICAD for Africa and PALOP: development, economic and political connections

When the TICAD process was launched in 1993, PALOP states, like most African countries, were in transition from a one-party state to multi-party democratic elections. Meanwhile, while Africa was being sidelined TICAD-I called global attention to African development and the sharing of African experiences through South-South cooperation (SSC). And, although Japan's aid volume to the continent as a whole was not visible as ODA pledges ranged between US\$650-750 million from 1993 to 1998, for the first time since the Cold War²³ Japan engaged in conflict-affected countries, helping their transition from war to development. As a result, following TICAD-I, Japan's assistance to Angola and Mozambique emphasized landmine removal assistance.²⁴ In the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA) which TICAD-II adopted in 1998, African countries were called on to apply the twin concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership', first promoted in the OECD/DAC New Development Strategy Report Shaping the 21st Century of 1996. The problem was that within PALOP, Mozambique was the only country that offered the political conditions and economic viability necessary for it to be worth considering it a priority nation by the Japanese government,²⁵ and worth further strengthening the emerging partnership for sustainable

development within TICAD-II.²⁶ In order to reinforce the partnership, Japan opened an embassies in Mozambique in 2000 and in Angola in 2005 and a JICA office in Mozambique in 2003 and in Angola in 2007. However, the absence of Japanese embassies and JICA offices in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé created a political vacuum between Japan and these PALOP nations, thus hindering the twin concepts stressed in the TAA. This void was only filled between TICAD-IV and V.

As the five case studies below will show, from 1974 to 1990 development cooperation ties between Japan and PALOP members were almost non-existent as most of them were engulfed in serious economic governance problems and political instability. The ODA Charter of 1992 clarified the philosophy and the principles, while the revised Charter of 2003 emphasized the priorities (poverty reduction, sustainable growth, global issues, and peacebuilding) of Japan's foreign aid policy.²⁷ Because there is no distinction between aid 'through the TICAD processes and 'non-TICAD' aid, one can say that TICAD policies translated these principles into projects and programs to be used by African countries towards their development.²⁸ It became a diplomatic platform through which PALOP elevated its ownership in partnership with Japan to a higher level of cooperation than ever before.

Cape Verde

The first economic cooperation agreement between Cape Verde and Japan was signed in 1979.²⁹ The links between Cape Verde and France and Portugal kept Japan away.³⁰ Despite being resource-poor and highly dependent on aid to cover food needs, the achievements of Cape Verde on the MDGs, a major priority of TICAD-IV, earned the Small

Island Developing State (IDS) promotion from the list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in 2008 to that of Middle Income Countries (MICs). In addition, its vast fishery resources boosted Japan's renewed interest.

So TICAD-IV created the possibility for Cape Verde to benefit from Japan's concessional loans. Accordingly, in 2011, Japan was asked to integrate the Budget Support Group along with other development partners.³¹ In line with TICAD and to comply with the MDGs, Japanese aid financed the Transformation Strategy and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (GPRSP) focusing on agriculture, the judicial system, energy, water and basic sanitation, health and fisheries.³²

Following the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in 2009, Japan provided Cape Verde a fund of US\$890,000 to support development projects for the sustainable use of fishery resources in African countries bordering the Atlantic.³³ As a result, in 2010, JICA upgraded the port-fishing facilities in the island of Mindelo em Sao Vicente, to the value of €2.7 million.³⁴ And, in 2014, 14 ships from Japan were licensed and their catch totaled 1,371 tons.³⁵ Because few Cape Verde vessels are able to operate to the limits of its EEZ, Cape Verde's fishing policy is to provide access to foreign fleet operators from the EU, Japan and Senegal to exploit its oceanic fishery resources.³⁶

Finally, to continue supporting Cape Verde's transition from a lower to a middle-income country and to help it towards the Post-2015 Development Agenda, in a 2013 TICAD-V summit meeting Japanese Prime Minister Abe assured Cape Verde's Prime Minister José Maria Neves a new Yen loan for the improvement of water supplies using Japanese technology.³⁷

Guinea-Bissau

Already considered the first narco state of Africa, since independence in 1974 Guinea-Bissau has been prone to socio-political crisis and fragility. No president has been able to serve a full term in office. In the last ten years alone, the country has experienced civil war in 1998/99 and consecutive military coups in 1999, 2003, 2008, 2012 and 2015.³⁸ Such events explain why Bissau is virtually a post-conflict country. As a result, Japan suspended ODA to Guinea-Bissau from 2004 and 2007 and barred Bissau from participating in TICAD-IV and V. Although Japan is not a traditional donor to Bissau, the growing importance of Bissau in Japan's peacebuilding and development agenda mixed with economic diplomacy is clear, as reflected for example in the USD 128.5 million in ODA from 2009 to 2013.³⁹

With few natural resources, the interest Guinea-Bissau holds for Japan results from its fishery stocks and its need for Bissau's vote to obtain a majority in support of its whaling agenda launched in late 1990s. In this context, the visit to Japan of PM Caetano Ntchama in 2000 and the training workshop held in Tokyo in 2001 for representatives from six West African states, including Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, revived relations between the two countries.⁴⁰ This workshop reminded Guinea-Bissau of the importance of the whales-eat-fish issue in Japan. Not surprisingly, political instability, persistent poverty and drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau led the government of its Prime Minister N'Dafa Cabi to request the UN Security Council include the country on its Agenda of Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in July 2007.⁴¹ Following the visit by Japanese ambassador Yukio Takasu, Chairperson of the PBC, to Guinea-Bissau in April 2008, critical peacebuilding priorities were identified.⁴² These included building governmental capacity, public sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, security sector reform and assisting the electoral process. Stopping drug trafficking

and organized crime, promoting human resources development, addressing the needs of vulnerable groups and rehabilitating infrastructure were also included. At Takasu's request, Japan enacted an ODA rolling plan for Guinea-Bissau in 2010 and, in line with TICAD-IV, began coordinating assistance with the UNPBC to Guinea-Bissau, focusing on political and social security.⁴³

Following the military coup of April 2012, Japan donated a further USD 44,800 to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mission in Guinea Bissau.⁴⁴ In 2014, Tokyo contributed a further US\$10 million to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) also used to support the presidential elections held in Bissau in 2014.⁴⁵

São Tomé and Príncipe

Since 2010 the African Development Bank has classed São Tomé as a fragile state.⁴⁶ The small archipelago shares a recent discovery of oil with East Timor, a fragility driven mainly by poverty, economic vulnerability and lack of infrastructure with Guinea-Bissau and climate change and erosion problems with Cape Verde.

As with Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, Japan established diplomatic relations with São Tomé following the country's independence in July 1975. However, by 1963 Japanese vessels were already involved in the transshipment of fishery products in São Tomé waters.⁴⁷ After the first multi-party elections in 1991, political instability, increasing poverty among São Tomé's 170,000 inhabitants and corruption scandals involving the former PM Maria das Neves over the sale of USD 1.3 million of rice donated by Japan in 2004 prevented closer bilateral relations between the two countries.⁴⁸ Despite the participation of São Tomé in the second and third TICAD, in line with the ODA Charter of 1992, Japan suspended ODA to

the tiny archipelago from 2004 to 2006, resumed in 2007 for humanitarian reasons to tackle poverty.⁴⁹

Like Cape Verde, São Tomé's fishery sector is dominated by traditional, small-scale fishing activities, which makes Japanese assistance in the sector highly important in promoting inclusive and sustainable economic growth. As a result in 2008, two months before TICAD-IV and in return for USD 1.3 million of aid in rice, technical and financial assistance as well as fishing training for São Tomé staff, and a new fishing agreement was also signed with Japan, allowing Japanese fishing vessels to fish for tuna in its EEZ.⁵⁰ One should note that fishing is the major activity in São Tomé's coastal communities and represents four percent of GDP. It also provides employment, income for communities and protein for poor households.⁵¹

It is expected that the oil sector will become the main growth driver of São Tomé's economy. Since 2003, Chevron, Canada-based Addax Energy and its subsidiary China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) have acquired tenders of offshore petroleum reserves.⁵² These companies have not found amounts worth exploiting commercially; dampening their early enthusiasm including that of Japan which besides reaffirming its support for São Tomé at TICAD-V (2013), has not demonstrated any particular interest in exploiting the archipelago's oil resources.

Angola and Mozambique

The post-conflict affectedness of these two natural resource-rich countries turned them into a model for the TICAD-III (2003) three-pillar framework (human centered

development, poverty reduction through economic growth, and consolidation of peace), as the legacy of the war required an integrated approach to rebuild the countries. Since then the application of Japan's 'new' Charter in both countries comes as no surprise as following TICAD-IV (2008) JICA and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) began promoting self-reliance development for both countries.

In 2012, JBIC financed three buyers' credit agreements for the export of textile manufacturing machinery made by Toyota Industries Corporation and Murata Machinery for rebuilding state-run textile manufacturing plants.⁵³ These loans also facilitated Japanese oil trading and infrastructure-related companies in Angola such as Sojitz Corporation, Marubeni, Sumitomo and INPEX (2015), a subsidiary of Japan Oil Development Co. (JODCO), which acquired a 9.99% indirect interest in the oil producing Angola Block 14 in 2013 with plans to further expand exploration production activities until 2035.⁵⁴

In 2015, a 'development policy loan' via JICA for sector reforms worth US\$200 million was signed with Angola.⁵⁵ Compared with previous loans this one is in line with the 'new' Charter, as Angola has to meet three conditions: It needs to start issuing multiple-entry visas for Japanese citizens, improve international remittance services and revise private investment laws to ease Japanese businesses in the country to counter China's growing presence there.⁵⁶

Mozambique

Prior to TICAD IV, the joint trade and investment mission of MOFA and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) to Mozambique decided that to reduce the risks of Japanese firms involved in the mining sector Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National

Corporation (JOGMEC) would be used to promote resource development.⁵⁷ Thus that same year Japan's Mitsui Corp. acquired a percent interest in the Mozambique Offshore Gas Area with 75 percent funding from JOGMEC.⁵⁸

Following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, securing a stable supply of energy in Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) has become critical to Japan as a replacement to lost nuclear capacity. The gas reserves discovered in Mozambique in 2010, the largest in Africa, attracted US Anadarko Petroleum which, in 2014, signed a non-binding agreement with Mitsui to supply natural gas in the form of LNG to Japan.⁵⁹ Also in 2011, JBIC agreed on a loan worth USD 4.8 million for Sojitz Maputo Cellulose to produce wood chips and export them Japan as a raw material for paper production.⁶⁰

In January 2014, PM Abe paid a visit promised at TICAD-V and established a Development Initiative based on natural coal and gas, a so-called 'Amizade' (friendship in Portuguese) with Maputo with an assistance package of USD 670 million to further develop the Nacala region.⁶¹ This visit resulted in the signing of a MoU between JBIC and Mozambique's Ministry of Mineral Resources (MIREM) to facilitate mutual capacity-building and the implementation of mineral resources-related projects in Mozambique.⁶² As a result, Mitsui has agreed with Brazilian firm Vale's subsidiary to participate in the Moatize coal mining project and the Nacala Corridor rail and port infrastructure project which Vale had been operating in Mozambique.⁶³

It seems evident that Japan's priority policy for development cooperation in Mozambique is strategically focused on the exploration of natural and mineral resources. It should be added that in May 2013, prior to TICAD V, METI re-endorsed the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) established in 2009 and organized the first Japan-Africa Ministerial Meeting

for Resources Development (JAMM).⁶⁴ Since then there is an effort of both parts to shift from simple natural resources extraction to ‘transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development’.⁶⁵ JAMM’s plan is for Japan to partner with Japanese private businesses in promoting the basis of an African resource industry with social and economic infrastructure capable of realizing inclusive growth. In addition, JAMM aims to strengthen human resource development applying safety, environmental and sustainable standards while meeting the needs of local communities.⁶⁶

Based on this, the final section draws attention to Japanese firms’ contribution to overall sustainability. It also assesses JICA’s projects and explores Japan’s South-South and Triangular cooperation (TrC) initiatives to cope with the challenges of energy and food insecurity by delivering ‘quality’ and sustainable economic growth with productive employment.

3. JAPAN’S ‘NEW’ CHARTER: BOOSTING SUSTAINABLE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

Compared with previous charters the ‘new’ Charter is broader in scope as is designed to be in line with the priority themes of TICAD-V: a robust and sustainable economy; an inclusive and resilient society and peace and stability. Accordingly, such growth should be attained through ‘inclusiveness’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘resilience’ as a force of equity and social

empowerment that includes all people at risk of exclusion and marginalization so as to build a peaceful, sustainable and secure society within the concept of human security.⁶⁷

Within this context, the Japanese government has offered support to the notion of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of private Japanese companies in Africa through public-private partnerships.⁶⁸ Although there is no accepted definition of CSR, the companies who integrate societal concerns into their business policies and operations - including environmental, economic and social concerns - can be said to practice a CSR approach.⁶⁹

Within Japan's development cooperation, this new kind of sustainable business is a new strategic approach of METI that addresses the bottom of the pyramid (BoP) needs of the poor through business partnerships with mutual benefits for both sides.⁷⁰ As a result, the activities of Japanese companies are focused on inclusive business to achieve sustained, effective, economic cooperation, while allowing Japanese firms to make inroads into overseas markets.

Thus Mitsui has been combining extractive resource development (titanium ore) with sustainable growth to increase agricultural productivity fueled by a solar-powered irrigation project for a farming community in the province of Gaza, Mozambique. This project is part of the Guardian Sustainable Business (GSB) program that the Japanese government has been carrying out through a Japan-UNDP partnership fund in more than 15 countries since 2003.⁷¹

In addition in 2009, as a collaborative initiative to end poverty, Mitsui & Co. agreed with the UNDP to invest US\$2 million in a development assistance program in the Chibuto African Millennium Village (AMV).⁷² The Millennium Village program will increase

agricultural productivity through irrigation systems and contribute to improving the income of around 13,000 people living in the district.⁷³

In 2015, the Mitsui & Co. Africa Fund also donated US\$70,000 to aid relief efforts in the areas affected by the floods in Northern Mozambique.⁷⁴

Another Japanese firm which has embraced corporate social responsibility is Sumitomo Corporation Africa with several projects in Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar, South Africa and Angola.⁷⁵ As landmines destroy the very foundations of society be they social or economic, Sumitomo has been supporting the Japan Mine Action Service (JMAS) since 2008. Also, in cooperation with the Angolan Ministry of Health's National Malaria Control Program, Sumitomo Chemical Co. has been helping efforts to eradicate malaria through the supply of insecticide-treated mosquito nets to the Angolan people.⁷⁶

Aid volume

A major part of TICAD's efforts to end poverty, hunger and achieve food security, the first of the SDGs⁷⁷, is through ODA. As Table 1 shows, from 1997 to 2013 Japanese ODA to Lusophone Africa have increased to all PALOP countries barring Guinea-Bissau due to its political instability. Mozambique receives the lion's share of Japan's aid within PALOP at US\$1,153 million, followed by Angola (US\$583 million), Cape Verde (US\$328 million), Guinea-Bissau (US\$72 million) and São Tomé and Príncipe (US\$35 million).

Table 1. Japan Total Bilateral Net ODA to Lusophone Africa, 1997-2013 (USD million)

Years	Angola	Mozambique	Cape Verde	São Tomé	Guinea-Bissau
	Conflict-affected		MDG achiever	Fragile States	
1997	12,0	38,1	2,4	0,9	7,5
1998	17,9	40,6	2,8	1,4	11,6
1999	22,0	63,3	8,5	0,1	1,5
2000	25,1	29,3	11,6	1,4	..
2001	23,2	41,1	4,2	1,1	0,2
2002	28,3	72,7	7,4	1,4	0,2
2003	33,5	38,4	12,7	1,4	0,1
2004	26,9	22,7	4,2	1,5	0,0
2005	29,2	20,1	2,9	1,8	0,1
2006	15,9	106,8	3,5	0,1	0,1
2007	26,0	38,5	2,3	3,3	1,2
2008	17,8	29,9	6,9	7,2	6,6
2009	5,6	116,4	9,3	3,2	14,7
2010	130,9	21,9	5,3	2,6	13,3
2011	8,0	41,9	2,9	2,7	11,7
2012	153,9	152,6	75,3	2,7	0,0
2013	6,9	279,2	165,4	2,7	3,5
Total	583,0	1153,5	327,7	35,3	72,3

Note: São Tomé - São Tomé and Príncipe

Source: Author based on OECD.Stat, accessed 21 October, 2015, <<http://stats.oecd.org/#>>.

JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation), <<https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/efforts/support>>.

Findings of Ex-Post/Ex-Ante Evaluations

The analysis of the 17 projects only looked at Mozambique, Angola and Cape Verde as JICA (or MOFA) evaluations for Guinea-Bissau and Sao Tome are not available. Project outputs included agriculture, health, education, water systems and economic infrastructure (bridges and roads) for Mozambique; water, health, transportation and energy for Angola and fishery, electricity and water systems for Cape Verde.

Overall, one can confirm that almost all projects were considered ‘effective’ as they attained their well-being objectives. Only three out of 17 projects were classified ‘Fair-B’ or ‘Low’ while the remaining achieved a ‘High-A’. It follows that their impact, taking into account the positive and negative changes noted on completion of the projects, shows that most of them (12 out of 17 projects) achieved their initial outputs. However, their sustainability – i.e. whether the benefits will continue after Japan’s funding ceases - shows a different pattern. While the sustainability is not at risk in Angola, it is in Cape Verde and Mozambique. The major reason for this is the lack of financial resources or insufficient technical staff to ensure the maintenance of facilities (see Tables 2-4). This shortcoming has been corrected, for example in a recent JICA project in Mozambique for Capacity Development in Road Maintenance in 2014 through adequate training in Japan with high levels of understanding on the theoretical aspects of road maintenance technology.⁷⁸

Mozambique

Based on the sixth Japan-Mozambique Policy Dialogue in 2011 and Japan’s 2013 ODA rolling plan for Mozambique, JICA remains focused on helping Mozambique to go beyond the MDGs with projects for sustainable agriculture, health, education, water and sanitation, infrastructure and climate change.⁷⁹ From Table 2 it can be seen that with regard to effectiveness/impact six out of eight projects were rated ‘High-A’ as objectives were achieved. However, their sustainability rated ‘Fair-B’ due to a lack of technical staff or insufficient financial resources for operation and maintenance.

Table 2. JICA Projects by Type to Mozambique, 2004-2014: Findings from *Ex. Post* and *Ex. Ante* Evaluations

Project Sector	Completion Date	Project Name and Major Output	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability / Rating (High A; Fair B; Low C)
Agriculture	March 2010	Small-scale farmers' techniques in Chokwe Irrigation Scheme and income improved	Fair B - as farmers adopted new techniques for rice	High A - areas cultivating rice in this area increased	Fair B - as financial and technical measures should be taken
Agriculture (Ex. Post and Ex. Ante)	2012-30	(ProSAVANA-JBM) - Triangular cooperation for agricultural development among Japan-Brazil and Mozambique, while taking into account the environment and seeking	Future effectiveness depends of improving agricultural productivity farmers	Fair - The Nacala project has failed to understand the needs of the farmers	High A - the creation of cluster in the Nacala Corridor will depend of more private investment and involvement of small farmers
Health	March 2006	The Institute of Health Science of Quelimane improved the no. of courses and students	High A - objectives were achieved	High A - practical training classes improved	Fair B - due to financial aspects of operation and maintenance
Education (to All children age 6-13 by 2015)	March 2007	Construction of Chimoio Primary Teacher Training Center improved the quantity/quality of teachers	High A - largely achieved its objectives	High A - certified teachers improved in Manica province	Fair B - lack of financial resources and insufficient technical staff
	March 2009	Construction of Cuamba Teacher Training Center, improved the number of qualified teachers	High A - Ratio of teachers rose from 62.9% (2006) to 88.1% (2011)	High A - contributed to highly qualified graduates	Fair B - Concern about maintenance cost
Water	February 2004	Groundwater for Rural Water Supply in Zambezia improved the water-supply population in 98%	High A - steady improvement from 345,000 people to 647,800 people	High A - as the no. of diarrhea cases decreased from 2000 to 2008	Fair B - lack of technical and financial capacity of the Community Education and Participation (PEC)
Economic Infrastructures	December 2010	Construction of Bridges on Rural Roads in Zambezia and Tete Provinces as vehicle weight was alleviated	High A - weight alleviated from 25 to 48 tons; traffic volume doubled	High A - market, regional industry, and economic growth expanded	Fair B - Staff shortage to properly maintain trunk roads and bridges
Transportation	August 2014	The project for Capacity Development of Road Maintenance. Road inspection was improved. The road maintenance guidelines to revisit basics of road maintenance techniques was achieved.	High A - Capacity of ANE is strengthened in terms of road inspection, planning. are expected to strengthen ANE's	Fair B - ANE's capacity of road maintenance was enhanced. Exists good prospects for duplicating this achievement in other provinces.	High A - Trainings provided in Japan will enable ANE to bridge the technical gap in road repair works in other provinces.

Note: ANE - Mozambique National Road Administration (Administração Nacional de Estradas).
Source: Author based on JICA Ex. Post Evaluations from 2007-2013, (n.d.), <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/ex_post/index.html>.
MOFA, 'Pro-SAVANA JBM', Quick Impact Project Report, March 2013, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/prosavana/pdfs/03_shiryu_04.pdf>.
JICA, 'The Project for Capacity Development of Road Maintenance', Terminal Evaluation Result, August 2014, <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/term/africa/c8h0vm00001rp75-att/mozambique_2014_02.pdf>.

In keeping with the TICAD process and long before it gained its associate status at the CPLP, Japan has been enhancing opportunities for TrC between Brazil and Lusophone countries such as Angola and Mozambique.⁸⁰ In 2011, based on SSC Japan and Brazil launched the TrC project Tropical Savannah Agricultural Development in Mozambique (ProSAVANA). This triangular Japan-Brazil-Mozambique (JBM) partnership envisions the improvement of the livelihood of inhabitants along the Nacala corridor by increasing agricultural production with better crop varieties that enable the creation of employment

through agricultural investment and the establishment of a wide value chain.⁸¹ However, fears of large-scale land acquisitions or ‘land grab’ have been a constant among Mozambican civil society organizations led by the National Peasants Union which accuses the JBM partnership of protecting large Brazilian agri-business and leaving them out of the ‘win-win’ partnership.⁸² Whether inclusive growth at a local level is being realized is debatable, as small farmers have neither increased their agricultural productivity nor gained market access for their products.⁸³

Angola

When compared to other DAC donors, Japan’s aid volume to Angola is lower than to Mozambique. This is explained by Angola’s later peace in 2002 and subsequent transition from post-conflict reconstruction to development. Nevertheless, Japan is Angola’s second largest donor with a total of US\$323.1 million from 2008 to 2013. Based on the consultations between Japan and Angola on economic cooperation in 2006 a country assistance policy (CAP) for Angola was drawn up. The assistance policy defined three priority areas, later addressed in the 2012 ODA rolling plan: (i) economic development with a focus on human resource development through education and vocational training, basic infrastructure development, and agriculture / food security (ii) the establishment of peace, mainly directed toward the social reintegration and resettlement of demobilized soldiers, internally displaced people and refugees, etc. and mine clearance and (iii) human security with a focus on health care.⁸⁴

Like Mozambique, with the exception of one project in the water sector the remaining projects in Angola (health, energy, infrastructure and transportation), largely

achieved the planned results, though not without problems. For example, although not affecting the ‘effectiveness’ or the final ‘impact’ of JICA’s ‘Rehabilitation of Port Facilities of Namibe and Lobito’ in Angola, the competition between China and Japan in bidding for projects affected implementation due to a drastic mid-project change. As a result, the National Reconstruction Office (GRN) excluded the Lobito Port from the project and included the Benguela Railway Rehabilitation Project financed through China’s International Fund.⁸⁵

The paper finds that, in contrast to Mozambique, the evaluation of JICA’s projects in Angola shows that only one in five had financial problems with operation and maintenance (Table Three). In other words, the positive changes and benefits resulting from JICA’s intervention continued afterwards. An example is the Triangular Project for Capacity Building of the Angola Josina Machel Hospital that changed the paradigm in TrC as prior to this project this kind of cooperation between Japan and Brazil was small scale and for specific needs.⁸⁶ But, the ‘high’ effectiveness and impact of the Japan Brazil Partnership Program (JBPP) enabled further TrC on a larger scale in the Angolan health sector.

Nevertheless, security measures and training can be improved (Table 3). Basically, the sustainability of JICA’s projects in Angola was affected by a lack of transparency in decisions rather than by financial problems. An example of this was the ‘Project for Emergency Rehabilitation of Port Facilities of Namibe and Lobito’ (Table 3) which, barring changes in the top-down action of the GRN under the direct control of the President of Angola, is likely to affect future policy consultations between both governments. Notwithstanding, given the fragile governance of the Angolan government there is room to

improve the project implementation process, as the importance of bilateral agreement was not fully understood by the Angolan side.⁸⁷

Table 3. JICA Projects by Type to Angola, 2005-2015: Findings from Ex. Post and Ex. Ante Evaluations

Project Sector	Completion Date	Project Name and Major Output	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability / Rating (High A; Fair B; Low C)
Water	March 2008	Emergency Rural Water Supply around Luanda achieved the objective to supply water to 70 villages	Low C - number of deep wells was far below 39 in 177 target	Fair B - ratio water supply increased to 44%	High A - no financial problems in operation and maintenance; but room to improve training
Health	August 2005	The Improvement of Josina Machel Hospital - repair / extension of facilities implemented as planned	High A - quantity and quality of health services largely improved	High A - solid and medical waste treated. Absence of negative impact	High A - No financial problem in operation and maintenance as it is the best hospital in the country
Health (1st JBPP-TrC (Brazil-Angola Japan))	March 2010	The Triangular Project for Capacity Building of Angola Josina Machel Hospital saw improvement of training and quality of services	High - A improved administration services, technical activities, nursing care, training courses	High A - mortality rate reduction of 1%; contributed regular JBPP-TrC for 700 medical and hospital health staff	High - A no financial problems as this project enabled further TrC in Angolan health sector
Transportation	March 2011	Emergency Rehabilitation of Port Facilities of Namibe and Lobito (later excluded); Nevertheless, the project largely achieved the results	High A - Cargo handling volume has strongly increased from 2010 to 2013	High A - gross tonnage and no. of ships increased Business has expanded	Fair B - Although there were no financial issues safety problems could arise as maintenance is not properly addressed
Energy (Ex. Ante Evaluation)	August 2015	Power Sector Reform Support Program aims to strengthen efficiency and competitiveness in the power sector	Reform the power sector through improving budgetary reliability to attract foreign direct investment	Increased transparency and public management is expected, thereby contributing to sustainable economic development in the country	

Note: TrC - Triangular Cooperation under Japan Brazil Partnership Programme (JBPP).

Source: Author based on JICA Ex. Post Evaluations from 2007-2013,

<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/tech_and_grant/project/ex_post/index.html>.

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Japan and PALOP South-South Initiatives: Sustainable Agricultural, Industrial and Fishery Cooperation

Another issue that is at the top of the South-South and Triangular cooperation agenda between Japan and PALOP and which takes into account concerns over food security and environmental degradation is the bio-fuel sector. From an industrial trade and development perspective, the 2007/2008 global food crisis, and more recently so-called 'land-grab' issues in Mozambique and the oil crisis in Angola, have prompted these two

Lusophone countries to power their agriculture and gas resources to diversify their industry output whilst contributing to more inclusive development and climate change mitigation.⁸⁸ However, this form of industrialized agriculture also has negative environmental impacts including the increased use of agrochemicals, soil erosion and water pollution.⁸⁹

In response to the global demand for biofuel both developed and developing countries have been introducing biofuel policies. In 2009, Mozambique approved a National Policy and Strategy for Biofuels, which identifies biofuel as a high priority resource for Mozambique's energy security and economic development.⁹⁰ In 2010, the Parliament of Angola approved a law, which allows foreign companies to produce biofuel in the country if they ensure that the local population has access to water, basic services and medical care. Foreign companies are also required to sell a portion of their biofuels to the state oil company Sonangol to supply the local market.⁹¹ As for Japan, following the 2011 earthquake its imports of energy for generating power increased by approximately US\$30 billion.⁹² Hence, in April 2014 the Japanese government published its Basic Energy Plan. Accordingly, all oil refiners are required to supply 500 million liters (crude oil equivalent) of biofuels by 2017, mainly for energy security, to fight global warming and to revitalize regional economies.⁹³

Given that most ethanol in Japan is imported, METI is collaborating with JOGMEC to introduce biofuels into the market. In this context, biofuel production has strong technical synergies with the established sugar industry in Mozambique and in Angola bio-ethanol is a strong candidate to add value to sugar cane activity. Within the CPLP framework, Mozambique, which produces two million tons of raw materials from sugarcane, has already signed cooperation projects with Brazil and Portugal and attracted foreign investors from Brazil, the EU, India, China and Japan.⁹⁴

Also, since 2010, the University of Tokyo has been cooperating with Mozambique to reduce CO₂ emissions, improve the lives of local residents and promote local industry. These goals have been achieved through cultivating biodiesel fuel plants that are not suitable for crop cultivation in arid regions and by using the resulting solid fuel to produce environmentally-friendly fuel to replace the firewood and charcoal that are currently major sources of fuel in Mozambique.⁹⁵ In addition, Mozambique's gas reserves can also be used to produce fertilizer that could benefit small farmers and local industry. Japan's Toyo and Sumitomo have also presented two fertilizer projects, while Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Marubeni have proposed producing methanol for export to Japan.⁹⁶

In Angola, Marubeni is building a US\$650 million⁹⁷ factory which will be able to produce 400,000 tons of sugar and 40 million liters of ethanol. In combination with sugar cane plantations, 15,000 jobs will be generated, thus revitalizing a community in which many people work in neighboring Namibia.⁹⁸ Hence, both countries have important alternative development opportunities for promoting industrialization, ultimately increasing the likelihood of achieving the SDGs that replaced the MDGs.

Cape Verde

In Cape Verde, about 50% of the people are engaged in agriculture and fishing. With 44% of the population living below the national poverty line, Japanese aid has focused on basic human needs and the fishery sector, targeting poverty reduction and social equality in line with TICAD. Since the graduation of Cape Verde from LDC status in December 2007, Japan has shifted its focus to ODA loans. As a result, in 2010 Japan was the major bilateral

donor to Cape Verde followed by Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United States.

In line with TICAD IV-V priorities to ‘accelerate growth’ towards a ‘robust and sustainable economy’ and an ‘inclusive and resilient society’ JICA signed two yen-loans in 2012-13 with the small island worth US\$78.8 and US\$150 million to finance electricity supplies necessary to the archipelago and freshwater through the desalination procedure in the poor rural areas of Santiago Island (Table 4).⁹⁹

Another strategic sector for economic growth and poverty reduction in the country is the fishery sector as marine products account for 76.8% of total exports in Cape Verde. The Mindelo Fishing Port project has partially achieved its planned objectives to increase capacity for freezing and cold storage and fishing vessels.¹⁰⁰ However, the demand for ice has decreased due to an increase in the volume of fish going to Frescomar, a company that buys landed fish directly from fishermen. This is having an impact on the long-term viability of the project and the sustainability of the Fishing Complex.¹⁰¹

Table 4. JICA Projects by Type to Cape Verde, 2008-2013: Findings from *Ex. Post* and *Ex. Ante* Evaluations

Project Sector	Completion Date	Project Name and Major Output	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability / Rating (High A; Fair B; Low C)
Fishery	February 2009	Extension of Facilities at Mindelo Fishing Port, achieved the objectives of stable supply of ice for fishing boats	Fair B - fish going to local markets decreased 50%; and price of ice increased	Fair B - fishermen motivation to buy appropriate volume of ice based on quality standards decreased, affected by ice price	Fair B - Fishing Complex lacks revenue to cover maintenance costs, includes electricity and water.
Electricity (Ex. Ante Evaluation)	March 2008	Power Generation, Transmission, Distribution Capacity Building Project expects to achieve the objectives to supplying electricity for the economy	It is expected that the diesel power plant provides stable supply of and improve access to electricity	It will allow desalinating saltwater to drinking water; it will raise people's standard of living by supplying electricity	There are technical risks due to lack of expertise and financial future costs to ensuring regular maintenance of facilities to other health and services.
Electricity (Ex. Ante Evaluation)	March 2012	Electricity Transmission Distribution Network Develop. expects to increasing energy supply to secure water resources	The project expects to meet demand for healthcare, social services and desalination water	Expects to improve living conditions of people by reducing electricity costs, to local residents	Based on past projects electricity must be affordable to poor residents Financial future costs for maintenance should arise
Water (Ex. Ante Evaluation)	December 2013	Water Supply System Development Project, expects to increase fresh water across the island	Expects to connect regional water systems, improve living conditions	To promote poverty reduction, social development household water supply from 54.6% to 95% by 2020	Operation and maintenance costs should arise with desalinated

Source: Author based on JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) Ex. Post and Ex. Ante Evaluation Projects, as follows:
 JICA, *The Project for Extension of the Facilities at Mindelo Fishing Port*, Republic of Cape Verde, November 2013, <http://www2.jica.go.jp/en/evaluation/pdf/2012_0709200_4.pdf>.
 JICA, *Power Generation, Transmission and Distribution Capacity Building Project on Santiago Island*, March 2008, <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/economic_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/capeverde01.pdf>.
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 JICA, *Water Supply System Development Project in Santiago Island*, Republic of Cape Verde, <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/evaluation/oda_loan/economic_cooperation/c8h0vm000001rdjt-att/capeverde_131220_01.pdf>.

Guinea-Bissau

With the outbreak of the civil war in 1998, Japan asked Senegal for cooperation in evacuating 17 Japanese citizens from the strife-torn country. As can be seen in Table 1, afterwards Japanese aid flows declined. Bilateral relations with Guinea-Bissau were normalized in 2007, and in 2010 Japan endorsed an ODA rolling plan focused on poverty reduction with projects related to basic human needs in four major sectors. These covered agriculture, education, health and social and economic infrastructures in the country.¹⁰²

The issue of peace and stability, a pillar of TICAD-V was further emphasized in the ‘new’ Charter, which highlights their importance as “prerequisites for nation-building and development”. Japan’s recently appointed ambassador to Guinea-Bissau Takahashi Kitahara from Mitsui & Co met with the Government of Guinea-Bissau in July 2015.¹⁰³ According to Kitahara without political stability and national reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau Japanese aid and economic cooperation is at risk.¹⁰⁴ This reveals not only the synergy between the private sector and the importance of the development-security nexus, but also Japan’s need to expand foreign direct investments in line with the latest aid Charter and the TICAD process. In 2014, Guinea-Bissau was reintegrated as a full member of the CPLP after its suspension following the military coup in April 2012.

São Tomé and Príncipe

Given the lack of an ODA rolling plan, economic cooperation between Japan and São Tomé and Príncipe is based on an agreement signed in 1999 which takes the form annually of non-repayable food aid. Although the ‘new’ Charter highlights the SIDS, the low volume of ODA demonstrates that São Tomé and Príncipe is a low priority for Japan, provided that Japanese private interests in the rice and fishing sectors are safeguarded. It is clear that São Tomé and Príncipe uses rice as a strategic lever to achieve both food security and to fund other activities.¹⁰⁵ Under the food aid project signed in 2012 between both parties, Japanese firms are the only eligible tenderers to supply rice to São Tomé and Príncipe. The money made from selling the Japanese rice is deposited in a São Tomé state fund, which covered the cost of the legislative elections in 2010, and the presidential elections in 2011.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Japan also co-funds fishing activities through fishing vessels, equipment and

technical assistance, and has also invested in social sectors, particularly education, health and infrastructure.¹⁰⁷

CONCLUSION

Based on the comparative analysis of Japan's ODA to Lusophone Africa, one can now answer the research question, which asked how the ODA Charter influences Japanese aid to PALOP in light of the TICAD process's three pillar framework.

Clearly, this Charter extends the possibilities for enhancing strategic development cooperation for inclusive growth in PALOP countries. This does not mean that the Charter in itself is the cause of Japan's increased bilateral relations with PALOP. As section two shows, Japan's development and economic relations with PALOP, prioritizing Angola and Mozambique, intensified after the Cold War particularly following TICAD-III in 2003. However, aid was mainly allocated to peacebuilding and development reconstruction. The remaining PALOP, despite their good governance reforms, did not seem relevant to Japan which opened embassies in Angola and Mozambique but not in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau or Sao Tome.

As section three demonstrated this trend began to change following TICAD-IV in 2008. Several international and domestic factors such as the 2008 financial crisis, China's strong engagement in PALOP and the Fukushima nuclear accident caused by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami prompted Japanese enterprises to react and look at Angola, Mozambique and other PALOP as potential investments targets, which explains Japan's wish to join the CPLP in 2014. However, it became evident that the priority that Japan gives to

each PALOP state differs, confirming our argument that although the Charter benefits both sides, Japanese public and private interests openly favor resource rich Angola and Mozambique at the expense of the smaller and poorest PALOP. Still the poorer PALOP's fishery stocks, their diplomatic importance in supporting sustainable whaling and achievements on the MDGs, particular in the case of Cape Verde, cannot be sidelined nor can Japan's foreign policy interests at the UN Peacebuilding Commission be ignored.

This paper also finds that the little amount of Japanese ODA to the smaller group of PALOP-SIDS (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) sustain the above and our assumption that, despite Japan's moral responsibilities in view of its recent CPLP observer associate status and in the light of the 'new' Charter, Japan can and should do much more for the well-being of these three SIDS.

Another reason explains (but not entirely) why aid flows were higher to Angola and Mozambique than to Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé. It relates to policy choices within these countries. Certainly, better governance particularly in Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé would improve bilateral ties as Japan would not need to suspend ODA. The opposite is also true. The paper has also confirmed that Cape Verde is a success story when it comes to achieving all or most of the MDG goals; nevertheless it still trails Angola and Mozambique with regards to ODA flows, despite a strong increase post TICAD-V. What the paper has confirmed, as promoted by TICAD and the latest Charter, is that the key to sustainable and inclusive growth is not development assistance (more ODA) itself, but rather development cooperation through public-private partnerships, increasing the chances of inclusive and 'quality' growth to PALOP.

Our findings also show that the ‘new’ Charter has broadened and legitimized Japan’s shift from a humanitarian and development aid policy toward a natural resource security policy ‘hidden’ in previous ODA Charters but currently promoted. The innovation of this Charter is evident in the development and social mission that the Japanese business sector is playing in PALOP in line with TICAD and the AMV beyond the simple exploitation of natural resources toward broad-based sustainable growth. Japanese firms’ (Mitsui and Sumitomo) corporate social responsibility in Angola and Mozambique in mining and energy sectors not only enable BoP business but also have synergetic effects with the Post-2015 Development Agenda and South-South and Triangular cooperation initiatives in health and agriculture sectors.

The article also presented findings from 17 projects with some contrasting results. Regarding their impact, only two out of the 17 projects were evaluated with ‘Fair-B’ and the remaining projects had ‘High-A’, meaning that overall, the targeted communities benefited immediately from the projects. However, their sustainability or lasting impact (after Japan’s funding has been withdrawn) is at risk due to financial and technical problems. Here, eight out of 14 projects (as the remaining three projects were *Ex-ante* evaluations) were classified with ‘Fair-B’. Those projects only scoring a Fair-B on sustainability because of lack of funds were mainly implemented in Mozambique and Cape Verde with only one in Angola. JICA is already working to ensure that cooperation with partner countries continues post-funding to avoid failure. Alternatively, the engagement of private investments or local companies can also guarantee longer benefits to local communities, hence its sustainability.

In conclusion, although Japan’s aid policy to PALOP-SIDS is consistent with the ‘new’ Charter and the TICAD framework, in contrast to Angola and Mozambique it seems

insufficient if the aim is to produce inclusive growth and development in terms of quantitative improvements, which could make a difference in, for example, income, employment, education, security or access to health services. On the whole we ought to conclude that Japan's Development Cooperation Charter is not being applied fairly (fair distribution) across all PALOP, rather it is being used to promote Japan's economic interests in the most resourceful PALOP members at the expense of the poorest. This outcome is not surprising given the longstanding cooperation between Japan and Mozambique and Japan and Angola when compared to the smaller PALOP and the lack of governance and political stability in the poorer PALOP. Nevertheless, the paper has demonstrated that over the past 21 years TICAD has benefited Japan's development cooperation with PALOP by strengthening and collaborating in their politico-security, economic and social systems.

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