THE TICAD AID NETWORK IN THE SHADOW OF RISING ASIA-AFRICA PARTNERSHIPS

Pedro AMAKASU RAPOSO

Abstract

As the first Asia-to-Africa development partnership to see daylight in 1993, the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD) has earned its place in Africa by creating an aid-network never seen before. Arguably, TICAD network produced opposed results: China and India launched similar partnerships with norms and aid practices against DAC norms of aid “tied” to trade and investment activities; represents a disruptive challenge to Japan’s model of partnership. Based on desktop study and structured interviews, it questions about the implications of TICAD normative principles for Africa for Asian development partnerships and for JICA in terms of ownership to understanding whether TICAD has changed them or instead was changed by them. It investigates how TICAD has influenced other emerging powers in Africa, who is “breaking” and why are not “taking” the DAC ODA norms, its implications towards aid effectiveness, the role of JICA and South-South Cooperation (SSC) in these development partnerships. This paper aims at finding points where TICAD normative principles can develop a differentiated view of inclusive and resilient SSC to increase TICAD development cooperation network. It finds that gradually Asian development partnerships differences (key principles and norms) are decreasing and their similarities (key areas and interests, cooperation modalities) are increasing.

Keywords TICAD, network, China, India, Korea, partnerships

WORKING PAPER

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INTRODUCTION

As the first Asia-to-Africa development partnership to see daylight in 1993, it is now clear that the normative focus (Raposo 2014; Yamada 2015) of the Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD) on African ownership sought to formulate policy informed by the views of African governments (DAC 2010: 30) was not successful as expected. One should note that with this we are not expressing the failure of the TICAD Process; on the contrary. The problem with TICAD is twofold. First, the principles (ownership and partnership) underpinning the TICAD network lack strength in terms of linking Japan’s ODA policy with African network itself. Second, China, India and Korea also created their development partnerships, held every three years. Here, networking means the political and economic mechanisms existent everywhere in the world. Governments, political parties, donors and development agencies, civil society organizations (CSO), informal institutions; all them (with more or less extent) exert networking agency to choose among several strategic options at each stage (Sumner and Tiwari 2009: 80, 84). However, the present weakness of African economies results from the loss of formal economic, political and institutional networking means that larger numbers of people have to rely in informal networking as the state cannot institutionalize effective open channels for the transmission of public and demands (Chabal 2009: 140). The emergence of TICAD was/is an opportunity for African countries choose their development path without having to rely on informal networks (away from global value chains) to survive, such as informal trade and other economic activities. Gradually, the TICAD normative principles (ownership and partnership) increased the consciousness of African leaders and their expectations on the
process (MOFA 2007); however, the lack of participation and coordination among stakeholders on which path to follow eroded TICAD response (Raposo 2014a). Frustrated with the lack of commitment from Northern donors to help Africa ending poverty towards the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Ebrahim 2009), African countries began to look at similar partnerships for more “effective development” rather than “effective aid” that meanwhile emerged. African countries welcomed these SSC partnerships as a response to global challenges. Arguably, externally TICAD influenced not only other Asian donors that established similar development partnerships networks, namely the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the India-Africa Forum (IAF), and the Korea-Africa Forum (KAF), demonstrates the virtues of Japanese development cooperation model. Domestically within Japanese ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA) there was no unanimity on which course should TICAD head to. Sadako Ogata, former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) became President of Japan Cooperation International Agency (JICA). MOFA had no other option but to accept the reformulation of Japan Cooperation International Agency (JICA) field operations under the concept of human security building on long experience at the expense of the private sector. In 2004, Ogata initiated a reform in the recent (2003) independent administrative institution toward a field-oriented approach, provided Japan’s ODA a normative soft power until then not formally addressed nor legally established. The problem was that MOFA bureaucrats were divided on the further application of this concept, partly because within the Ministry many were not aware of what human security meant, partly because the MDGs replaced human security as the key concept of Japan’s ODA policy (Edström 2011). In addition, FOCAC in 2000, the KAF in 2006, and the IAF in 2008 launched their respective South-South Cooperation (SSC) development partnerships, approached cooperation with Africa based on the idea of “mutual
benefit,” as opposed to the more “welfare-oriented” DAC notion of “charitable aid” (Kern at al. 2009).

**RESEARCH QUESTION**

It asks on the implications of TICAD normative principles for Africa, for Asian development partnerships and for JICA in terms of ownership to understand whether TICAD has changed them or instead was changed by them. In other words, it examines whether African recipients post-Cold War needs and/or emerging powers engagement in Africa have enhanced changes in TICAD towards a more ‘bottom-up’ approach, to make Japan’s agency more ‘ownership friendly’, ‘inclusive’ and ‘resilient’ or instead TICAD has changed the ‘old top-down’ approach of JICA (the major actor of Japan’s aid network) to strengthening the TICAD aid-network and at the same time the changes in development cooperation after 2000s.

**METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE**

The paper adopts a qualitative research approach based on relevant literature and structured interviews at JICA. Drawing on similar development approaches this paper compares the development model of four Asian countries, namely Japan, China, India and South Korea) to sub-Saharan Africa from the perspective of each donor normative aid regime and examines its outcomes and purposes. The first section contextualizes the foundation principles of TICAD and explains why they are “morally” essential to enhance
African ownership; it examines the implications of TICAD twin principles to DAC and Asian donors from the perspective of the aid effectiveness agenda. The second section draws on African disagreement over the DAC norms and questions why and who is “making, taking or breaking” the dominant norms of the OECD/DAC aid regime. The third section examines why South-South cooperation is an important driver for Asian donors development partnerships in view of increase awareness of African leaders disappointment with the traditional DAC aid approach that is not working towards their best interests. The fourth section examines the political and implementation constraints of these donors for partnership network cooperation. The conclusion summarizes the major findings of the article.

1. TICAD, DAC AND AFRICAN OWNERSHIP

African past and present history is known for its material deprivation and human suffering; therefore one believes that TICAD ownership and partnership is “morally” essential to enhance inclusive development (not growth) in order to capture all dimensions of poverty and resilience with focus on new risks away from political questions of power, institutions, vested interests and unequal distribution of resources based on the human security concept (Gupta et al. 2015; Murotani 2014). This is the normative, conceptual and implementing advantage of TICAD over other development partnerships as a key policy shift of TICAD towards the Post-2015 era (Murotani 2014; Peyroux 2015). Furthermore, the only way African can escape from the poverty trap is by investing in other productive activities in particular agriculture, trade and industry away from aid (dependence) so that
“aid” as the central instrument in most Western donors (including Japan’s to Africa) can be complemented with increasing “fair” trade and investment from private sector. However, in contrast to TICAD other Asian partnerships lack the inclusiveness development vision, which undermines governance principles and related instruments.

As Wangwe (2003) notes during the 1990s the ownership of recipients in terms of agency to discuss the aid process was practically inexistent. The aid relationship between African governments and donors was characterized by a donor-driven aid relationship without having in mind the ownership of developing countries and the importance of partnership as a back up to local actors (ibidem). However, in the era of globalization development cannot materialize without a model that provides recipients the role of partners so that they can exert agency and choose their path with mutual gains for both sides in the partnership. In this context, although network exist everywhere in societies, they divide and connect policy makers and non-policy makers inside and outside government; as a result, different opinions on which course to take, eventually arise on the agenda (Sumner and Tiwari 2009).

**African interests and happiness: implications for the DAC Aid Model**

In the context of “moral economy” (Sugimura 2007) one can argue that Africans have lost their agency as they lack power to influence development agenda (Sumner and Tiwari 2009). It follows that from the perspective of African interests, one has to ask which Asian partnership is more effective in terms of ownership as a mechanism for development management. In this context, Western interest or even Chinese interest in Africa within the established partnership (s) can be similar to those of the colonial era. So, what is the role of Western aid now? Is aid provided for altruism or pure national interest?
African countries began looking at alternatives ways of development as the international aid regime represented by DAC regulative, evaluative and practical norms, such as concessional character, grant element, untied aid, aid predictability… (DAC 1978), perhaps ethical better and effective no longer contributed to their happiness. Developed countries criticize FOCAC and IAF of undermine the efforts of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to make developing countries to understand the importance of principle of conditionality as an effective way to improving institutions in recipient countries (Raposo and Potter 2010; Trinidad 2013).

In other words, developing countries no longer recognized legitimacy to the DAC international aid regime as it was clear that DAC donors used the criteria of “effective aid” to achieve other foreign policy interests (trade, security, resource-seeking interests) rather than cooperate with developing countries (Klingebiel 2014: 19). As a result, DAC donors understood the need to “offer” recipient countries more ownership as an attempt to lessen their critiques against DAC policy conditionality around the effectiveness of aid (Eggen and Roland 2014).

**TICAD twin principles: implications for aid effectiveness**

A JICA officer to explain the entry of ownership into the lexicon of Japanese cooperation and philosophy through TICAD in 1993 emphasized the importance of Japan as a former recipient. Also, Japan was one of the first countries to promote a New

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2 Norms refer to intersubjective understandings about standards of legitimate conduct in specific areas of international relations. As a result, international norms identify the identity of an actor (constitutive norms); specify legitimate behaviour of actors, their rights and obligations (regulative norms); establish moral standards, judgements and prescriptions (evaluative norms); and provide commonly acceptable norms (practical norms). See: Patrick (2001: 136, 147).
Development Strategy that was adopted by the OECD in 1996 (Raposo 2014b: 23). Accordingly, the OECD/DAC issued a report *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*, in which the twin principles of TICAD became a central idea toward higher aid effectiveness were adopted (DAC 1996). The report without undermining the DAC values of humanitarianism and solidarity, emphasized the norms of good governance, democratic accountability, protection of human rights and the rule of law vital to ensure that international co-operation could be effective in supporting development and poverty alleviation (DAC/OECD 1996). Although the report in its Annex pointed out the importance of trade, investment and other linkages as a complement to ODA, King (2007) notes that with regard to the crucial role of economic infrastructures, central in Japan’s engagement with Asia, the report inputs were beyond expectations. As a member of DAC, Japan although not converging fully with DAC model discarded the strong infrastructure development approach of Asia (King 2007) and mixed it with DAC emphasis on social sector development (JICA 1998). Under the different macroeconomic conditions and outstanding debt problems of Africa, Japan (1998) began centring its efforts in poverty alleviation to support development strategies that ensure the poor access to the benefits of economic growth.

**TICAD normative principles: implications for China, India and Korea**

All the four countries have experience as both recipient and donor, useful to understanding the recipient side. Another commonality between these four Asian countries is that they all have development partnerships to engage with Africa being Japan the first to launch a regional mechanism – the TICAD (1993), followed by China with FOCAC (2000), Korea with KAF in 2006 and then India with (IAF) in 2008. Finally, all these partnerships
have adopted TICAD normative principles (ownership and partnership) with similar cooperation modalities, key areas and interests even thought with different aid priorities and market strategies. While Japan and South Korea are members of DAC, China and India are not interested even to be. Although India values the DAC (Japan and South Korea) human rights history, pro-democracy and culture of peace (Raposo 2014), it rejects the DAC foreign aid conceptual language in favour of development cooperation with its various forms of concessional financing (Mawdsley 2012: 121).

**China**

According with a JICA officer (2014) in the case of China the problem is more politico-ideological rather than developmental. The communist regime of China hinders the acceptance of DAC standard norms, such as transparency, quality of aid, policy conditionality and untied aid. China “ties” its aid with trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) and neglects because it is allowed to do so by recipient governments in Angola or Mozambique as in practice they are a one party-state like China (Lagerkvist and Jonsson 2011). Hence, there is no need to listen to civil society organizations (CSO) voices in aid (UN 2010: 36). As a result of China’s unfair practices the probability of erosion of the Western DAC model is stronger even though lessons apparently are working in Africa countries as well. Mozambique, Uganda and Ethiopia illustrate a shift from Western liberal model to the Asian development model (Eggen and Roland 2014: 92), but not to the Chinese “short-term gains” and “top-down” model of development (Moghalu 2014; Lagerkvist and Jonsson 2011). Chinese model not only limits the ownership of Africans in the sense that excludes civil society from the development process (Pontet and Gilpin 2012), but even the Beijing
Consensus “state-capitalism” of the SOEs and its applicability in Africa is unclear because of cultural, societal, political and economic reasons (Moghalu 2014).

**India**

In the case of India the problem seems to be moral and political in terms of bringing “justice” to Africa with whom it shares a history of subjection to colonisation (Naidu 2009: 116). Therefore, India is committed to balancing the norms it shares with China (not the practices) Japan and South Korea toward African best interests. A commonality between the four Asian donors (China, Japan, South Korea and India) when providing aid is the advocacy of self-reliance (ownership), equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit (or win-win outcomes) and respect of state sovereignty, India as the largest democracy in the world and in contrast with China shares with DAC members’ (Japan and Korea included) the normative values, such as culture of peace, diversity, human rights and democratic pluralism (Raposo 2014:112; Madswely 2012: 153). Of India, China, and Korea the latter is the one who has been most influenced by Japanese aid philosophical principles and norms (Kondoh 2013 et al. 142).

**South Korea**

This influence results from the massive Japanese aid for relief and rehabilitation of Korean economy since early 1960s. Hence, Korea development strategy to growing out of poverty was based on development infrastructures, developing private sector and investing in education under state influence to balance economic growth with social development (Eggen and Roland 2014: 91-2). The Korean development model functions in the context of state intervention as a complement for economic development (Kim 1995). It might work in African countries who depend on the availability of infrastructure and have businessmen
with capital ambition. However, the businessman who does not fit into this oligarchic capitalism economic model are left behind in the name of large conglomerates that create more inequality than equality and inclusion (Mogahlu 2014). From the development perspective, Korean aid model learnt from Japanese model and its holistic perspective that mix trade, investment and aid. Under Japan’s influence it is not a surprise that South Korea does not fully converge with the DAC aid model rather adapted its aid model based on Japan’s to that of DAC in order to gain its membership in 2010 (Kondoh 2015: 30). The Korea-African Partnership (KAF) besides promoting partner country ownership it shares with both India and Japan the norms of protection of human rights; peace, gender equality, and humanitarianism (Raposo 2014; Kim 2012). Like Japan, the factor that most influenced the Korean government to improve its neo-mercantilist image towards DAC common purpose of alleviating poverty and achieving the MDGs was the membership of DAC (Kim 2012).

2. ASIAN DAC AND NON-DAC DONORS: Norm-Breaker, Norm-Maker or Norm-Taker?

With the growing presence of Asian donors in Africa, disagreements over the norms of OECD/DAC that rule development cooperation, known as official development assistance (ODA) gradually arose. Further, the success of Asian development partnership and their model of development in Africa only confirm that the credibility of the DAC “rich club” is lost. Even after three decades of structural adjustment and pro-market economic
reforms, African capitalism is inexistent (Southall and Comninos 2009: 362). The reality is that aid by itself has been unable to lead Africa toward development, wealth and prosperity (Moghalu 2014). Within DAC “rich club” the only countries to challenge the mainstream neo-liberal development ‘ideology’ and the biased principle of ownership defined at the Paris Declaration (Rosser 2011) are Japan and South Korea with an aid model based on trade and investment as a complement to aid to reduce poverty through economic growth.

The Korean leadership has produced good results in the fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 at Busan (Korea) towards recognizing different positions (North/South) and needs (South-South) and potential contributions (South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation) toward a New Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation beyond the Paris Declaration and AAA. Paradoxically, according with Rosser (2014:177) the way in which Paris Declaration and AAA agenda deals with the principle of ownership clash with the principle itself; first because does not break with the era of neo-liberal agenda; second, it reinforces donor leverage over the development process of aid recipients who under the principle are now required to establish ‘operational development strategies’.

The question of legitimacy among DAC states and non-DAC states arise to know who has the authority to speak on behalf of Africans. The answer is no one has that right but Africans themselves. That is what ownership is all about. As a result, it is complicated to know who are the “breakers, makers and takers of norms” (Patrick 2001: 136). The question is whether the success the FOCAC is having in Africa provides China (or any other country) legitimacy to “breaking” the international normative aid regime, for example on policy conditionality, good governance and human rights aimed at promoting an alternative set of norms derived from its ideology. The answer might be obvious as Chinese aid is not as
altruist as Western aid, but African countries seem to prefer a relationship based on mutual benefit with political and economic advantages to both sides rather than a relationship based on paternalistic and altruist principles that hide other interests beyond development (Eggen and Roland 2014: 100-01).

**India**

The India-Africa Forum (IAF) partnership was established in 2008 after the unveiling of Indian Development Initiative in 2003, a set of commitments to reduce the debt of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Similar to FOCAC, the IAF is anchored in the principles of equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit. The 3rd edition of IAF will take place in October 2015 with consultations at the highest political level between the heads of government of 54 nations and India. Evidence of IAF norm breaking was the growing of exports credits, which DAC excludes as the purpose, is to promote international trade rather than economic development, welfare and humanitarian effectiveness. Under OECD definition India lines of credit (LOC) would count as other official flows (OOF), thus not considered a foreign aid instrument (Mawdsley 2012: 120-21). Paradoxically, India states that its ODA/OOF development programme is based on DAC norms, as these efforts are public to promoting mutually beneficial economic growth and not for pure, profit-oriented business (ibidem). Although China and India have signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, as a recipient rather than a donor, it does not mean they abide by all DAC norms as both countries provide aid in the form of grants and preferential loans, debt relief “tied” with trade and FDI activities (UN 2010: 53; OECD 2011: 55). However, there is also considerable non-compliance within Asian DAC members as regards some of its norms. For example, Korea needs to meet its commitments under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and
the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) to untying aid by 2015, and the share of Japanese untied aid in 2012 was 71%, below the DAC average of 79% (OECD 2012: 19-20; OECD 2014).

**China**

Nevertheless, China’s growing participation in DAC Study Group suggest that China can also be regarded as a “norm-taker” in the sense that DAC norms also influence China’s practices (Reilly 2012). The incorporation of DAC norms can be seen in China’s Second White Paper published in 2014. Accordingly, it shows a new trend in aid policy with poverty reduction as a major goal of Chinese foreign aid. Also, the White Paper elects improving “people’s livelihood” (aid to health, education and water), and “socio-economic development” as two important objectives of China’s foreign aid policy now much closer to DAC global norms embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 2014). China acceptance of some DAC norms and refusal of others suggest some indifference to set an alternative international aid regime as a norm-maker (Kondoh 2015); it can also means lack of political sponsorship or interest of recipients to accept to become norm-takers and follow the norm-breaker; or powerlessness to resist international pressures from the hegemonic DAC countries, or authority in terms of legitimacy to change the rules of the game as the costs of challenging the international aid regime would perhaps be higher than the benefits. It might be better for China to integrate some of the existing norms so as to be accepted in the international normative aid regime (Kondoh 2015; Reilly 2012; Xiaoyu 2012). As a result, traditional DAC donors have made an effort to engage both China and India in the existing development assistance framework within OECD/DAC (Price 2011).
Korea

Until 1996 when Korea has joined the OECD, its aid practices rarely advocated humanitarian values and were mostly tied to national strategic interests. In the new millennium, Korea government established a coalition with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and civil society including NGOs to converging towards the DAC universal values and norms to prepare Korea for DAC membership. Therefore, in 2006, Roh Moo-hyun, the president of Korea visited Africa, the first time in 23 years and announce the establishment of the Korean Initiative for Africa Development (KIAD) with a pledge to triple Korean ODA to Africa in three years from its 2005 level (Carvalho et al. 2012: 138; Darracq and Neville 2014: 6). As part of the initiative, Korea launched three complementary but separated (political, economic and) mechanisms for development cooperation with Africa. The first, the Korea-Africa Forum (KAF), a similar partnership to that of TICAD but more political is held every three years. The second, the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation Conference (KOAFEC) focus on trade and economic cooperation through supporting economic sectors and the third the Korea-Africa Industry Cooperation Forum (KOAFIC) (Raposo 2014). As a result of these initiatives Korean ODA increased from US$39.1 million (2005 level) to US$104 million in 2008 and to US$271 million in 2013 (OECD Stats, online). One can argue that Korea has become more of a norm-taker rather than a norm-breaker; however Korea who condemns China for its actions in Africa is also there for the same reasons. The OECD/DAC Peer Review (2012) report recommends Korea to converge toward DAC norms in the selection of recipients and aid allocation criteria, particularly its loan programme as sustainable levels of debts are a precondition for development, and so concessional loans are mostly given by DAC members to middle-
income countries. Korea loan allocation does not distinguish MICs (38% of its total) from least developed countries (39%) and of fragile states (41%).

3. ASIAN PARTNERSHIPS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION (SSC) AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION (TrC)

At this point, emerging powers like China (FOCAC), India (IAF) and South Korea (KAF) although not in position to challenge Japan’s ODA volume to Africa increased SSC to maximize development cooperation beyond the narrower DAC aid approach. While Japan’s SSC in TICAD shares its development experience acquired with Africa through ODA and other cooperation projects based on the resources of developing countries (JICA 2005); overall, emerging donors SSC has been restricted to state-to-state commercial and economic affairs leaving behind civil society organisations (CSOs). Because of the lack of democratic ownership (participation) and accountability of the institutions involved in SSC on both sides of the partnership inclusive development is at risk. In addition, while FOCAC and IAF operate outside the existing OECD norms on terms and conditions and untying aid; nevertheless the Indian International Development Cooperation Agency established in 2007/08 budget (Chatuverdi 2012: 174) similarly to JICA in TICAD and KOICA in KAF provides technical assistance under the notion of SSC through triangular cooperation (TrC) with focus on capacity building through training, exchanges of experts and sharing of experience and know-how (OECD 2012a).
**TICAD South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation (TrC)**

One of the characteristics of TICAD process is the transference of Japan’s Asian experience through SSC to Africa. In contrast to the Cold War ideological and narrower country-to-country assistance, TICAD changed the standard of Japan’s bilateral development engagement that assumed multilateral contours of continental partnership. Gradually, TICAD through JICA built an aid network with Africa with Triangular Cooperation (TrC) as a vital modality to supporting SSC as one way to enhance African ownership. As a result, the connection between Africa and Asia never has been so strong.

Since TICAD inception (1993-1998), SSC has been a priority of TICAD agenda, especially through supporting the NEPAD agenda, in such areas as agriculture, trade and investment, development of infrastructures, education, health and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). For example, at TICAD II (1998-2003) JICA worked with Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to establish the African Institute of Capacity Development (AICAD) towards poverty reduction; at the TICAD Ministerial meeting in 2001; the institutionalization of the “TICAD-NEPAD Joint Policy Framework” approved at TICAD III (2003-2008) and the TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment Conference (TICAD-AATIC) on November 2004 enhanced public and private networks of trade and investment between the two regions; also the Triangle of Hope (ZIPP-ToH) project aimed at increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment in Zambia from Malaysia.

At TICAD IV (2008-2013), some of JICA’s SSC/TrC initiatives include the One Village One Product (OVOP) to improve both production and sale techniques in rural African villages as part of the Aid-for-Trade (AfT) initiative that Japan announced to the WTO Summit in Hong-Kong held in 2005; JICA Kaizen projects in Africa (Africa Union,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Ghana, Tanzania, Zambia, Kenya…) to improve productivity in SMEs; Japan-Brazil Joint Cooperation in Angola (beneficiary country training program) for capacity building of Josina Machel Hospital; the TrC project of ProSAVANA-JBM (Japan-Brazil-Mozambique) program for Agriculture Development.

At TICAD V (2013-2017), according to each of TICAD three pillars the most relevant inputs of JICA with regard to SSC/TrC programs and projects are as follows. Under the 1st pillar (Robust and Sustainable Economy) dispatching policy advisors on investment promotion to 10 countries; support formulating 10 strategic master plans for comprehensive development (Northern corridor in Kenya/Uganda, Nacala corridor in Mozambique, West Africa Growth Ring, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, etc…), and development of industrial human resources through ABE Education Initiative. Under the 2nd pillar (inclusive development and resilient society) Japan also provides support for strengthening the resilience of African agriculture. Two major programs are the CARD (Coalition for African Rice Development) initiative aimed at doubling rice production in ten years to 28 million tons by 2018. Also, to ensure food security through an inclusive development approach between government, farmers and private partners, JICA “Smallholder Horticulture Empowerment Project” (SHEP), aims to achieving a better livelihood for small-farmers through improving their market access (Makino 2013: 91); assist disaster risk reduction, especially for island countries; Japan-Africa business women exchange program, or promotion of public-private partnership (PPP) towards sustainable growth and poverty reduction in Africa, among others. Under the 3rd pillar (peace and stability) JICA has provided development aid to prevent the recurrence and outbreak of conflicts in the following areas: governance, maritime safety, counterterrorism, peacebuilding and consolidation of peace (JICA 2014b).
FOCAC South-South Cooperation

In 1998, African countries asked China a similar partnership with that of TICAD. With Japan and other DAC countries further adjusting their African policies, China accepted African suggestion and established the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 (Anshan et al. 2012). FOCAC is a major instrument of China SSC driven mainly through bilateral ties. China SSC has a decentralized pattern in which three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, and Commerce) play leading roles (UNDP 2013). But, FOCAC SSC has broadened its agenda beyond economic, trade cooperation and development aid (Anshan et al. 2012). The FOCAC Action Plan (2013-2015) covers a wide range of areas (political affairs, regional peace and security, economic cooperation, cultural and people-to-people exchange) gradually converging with that of TICAD (Raposo 2014a). In the field of trade, China has offered duty-free exports to 30 African countries for the period between 2005 and 2012 (regarding agricultural products, minerals, leather, stones, and machinery components, etc.), (JICA 2013).

India-Africa Forum (IAF) South-South Cooperation

Since mid-1950s India has positioned itself as a leader in South-South Cooperation, much like the key role it played in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and earlier in the Conference of Bandung in 1955. By then, SSC was more political than economic concerned; nevertheless since 1964 when the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), was launched in 1964, ITEC has provided over US$ 2.5 billion worth of technical assistance to other developing countries, covering 156 countries in areas as diverse as information technology, education and enterprise development. In order to deepen SSC and move beyond trade, the India-Africa Project Partnership Conclave, held in March 2005,
focused on partnership projects between India and Africa. At request of African countries, particularly Senegal the Conclave established the Techno Economic Approach for Africa-India Movement (TEAM-9), between India and 8 countries of Africa to assist in the economic development of the region with a initial concessional credit of US$ 500 million and technology transfer to West Africa. These two initiatives opened the way to the India-Africa Forum (IAF) partnership of April 2008, expanded India’s SSC with a US$ 200 million line of credit under NEPAD, further extended at the 2nd IAF in 2011 with more US$5 billion over the next three years to help achieve Africa’s development goals (NEPAD 2011). The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme, which is centred on sharing of experiences and technology, is an important component of India’s new Development Partnership Programme, which was launched in January 2005, allows collaboration between DAC donors and participants in SSC (JICA 2012). To enhance trade and technology transfer the 2nd IAF (2011) established India-African Business Council to promote mutual trade between India and Africa. It also announced three pan-Africa research institutions and US$5 billion in credit lines to support infrastructure development and regional integration. In line with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) under NEPAD and to increase food supply and reduce hunger in Africa, the IAF agreed to improve agriculture productivity towards the achievement of the MDGs (JICA 2013).

**Korean-African Forum for Economic Cooperation (KOAFEC) SSC**

Differently from TICAD that is not aimed specifically at increasing trade flows itself with Africa but to supporting cooperation modalities for promoting business partnerships with Africa (Raposo 2014: 47), the Korean-African Forum for Economic Cooperation
(KOAFEC) established in 2006 is. The KOAFEC is jointly coordinated by South Korea’s Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Korean Eximbank to foster trade and economic cooperation.

Key features of Korea SSC are the Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) and the Development Experience Exchange Partnership Programme (DEEP), which was launched in 2012. The first is based on Korean development experiences and develops technical assistance in diverse sectors including agriculture, human resources, e-government and export promotion (Folley 2010: 87). The second covers various thematic issues of social development also based on Korean development experience (OECD/DAC 2012). In support of South Korea commercial diplomacy, the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion agency (KOTRA) under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade Industry and Energy (MOTIE) has a network of 10 overseas trade centres in sub-Saharan Africa. These trade centres located in Accra, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam, Douala, Johannesburg, Khartoum, Kinshasa, Lagos, Maputo and Nairobi identify specific projects through policy consultation (KSP). Although KOTRA targets particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through providing information and expertise, similarly to China it also supports state owned enterprises (SOEs) a major driver of Korean government to gain access to Africa’s oil and natural resources and tenders of major infrastructures projects (Darracq and Neville 2014). Within its priority partner countries in Africa (9) Korea delineates development strategies for each country to ensure ownership through the use of loans for infrastructure building and grants for technical assistance. Although oil is an important resource to South Korea development sustainability, as a major importer of grains food security also matters. As a result, South Korea has been involved in land investments and agriculture projects in Sudan, Madagascar, Tanzania and Mozambique (Folley 2010; Mah 2014). Among the most relevant
programmes / projects of Korea are in the agriculture sector, the New Community Movement Center built in Democratic Republic of Congo that lends its experience from Korea’s rural incomes in the 1970s. In this context, in 2008 the Korea-Africa Food and Agriculture Cooperation Initiative (KAFACI) was established and signed by 16 African countries to develop agriculture. Another example is the triangular business partnership between Korea-Portugal-Mozambique to tackle poverty and unemployment in Mozambique through a jointly project in agriculture and manufacture of textiles (cotton) (Mah 2014). In this quest, Korea has to avoid similar conflicts with local communities about land grabs like those who came up with JICA in the TrC ProSAVANA agriculture development project between Brazil-Japan-Mozambique (Mah 2014; Raposo 2014a).

**TICAD and Asian Partnerships South-South Trade and Investment Network**

The increasing south-south trade among developing countries offers wide scope for specialization and efficiency gains. Similarly, south-south FDI provides Africa an opportunity to take advantage of the new wealth and investment with the countries of the South (UN-LDC-IV 2011). Because Southern assistance goes in the form of concessional loans and lines of credit (LOC), usually tied to trade and investment flows the result is growing south-south development cooperation.

This explains why the emergence of Asian donors and their growing demand for African commodities and natural resources caused a redirection of African exports towards developing Asian countries, particular to China. It also explains why Japan is losing ground to China and India in Africa. More specifically, in contrast to TICAD where Japanese government creates instruments to support Japanese private sector, in the case of FOCAC and the KAF the government functions as the major driver of south-south trade and
investment through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to secure natural resources trade and investment activities in Africa with public-private partnerships (PPP) (Darrac and Neville 2014).

Even though Africa lacks a common policy to deal with outside partnership in equal terms (Moghalu 2014), the question is why Asian partnerships are having more commercial and economic success than TICAD? The answer lies at Chinese capacity to evade DAC norms which facilitates Chinese credit lines to African countries.

At the fifth FOCAC (2012), China pledged US$20 billion in three years to develop infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and SMEs in Africa, and a plan to use its currency yuan in trade settlement. It also established economic and trade cooperation areas in Zambia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Egypt by investing US$250 million in the development of infrastructures in those areas as an extension of the economic and political model of the East Asian development state with its performance-based rewards and incentives (JICA 2013: 5-53; Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2011: 49).

As for Japan with the growing public and private networks that Japan has developed through TICAD, African exports to Japan showed a positive shift, increasing from US$3.9 billion in 2000 to US$16.3 billion, or 2.6 percent of Africa’s global trade (Raposo 2014). After TICAD IV, Japan increased assistance to the development of small-scale local products and trade such as the “One Village One Product” movement, given the experience of the economic growth of Japan and East Asian development. For Japanese companies, the major objective when doing investments is to establish an international network of logistics and distribution, followed by securing resources and materials and developing local markets in line with TICAD V (2013) slogan of a “robust and sustainable economy” to assist Japanese private sector activities in Africa (JICA 2013: 5-56).
JICA has also begun its cooperative surveys to promoting BOP business network in FY 2010. Out of the 20 cases adopted in 2010, 10 cases were in Africa; in the first session of 2011 four cases out of 13 were in Africa in such sectors as water supply (Senegal), prevent infectious diseases (Uganda), solar lantern BOP business and insect nets (Kenya), agriculture machinery and manufacturing of solid fuel (Tanzania), fuel conversion (Mozambique), car recycling value chain (Nigeria), local production and consumption, and rehabilitation of roads in agriculture villages (Ghana), etc… (JICA 2013: 5-57).

Furthermore, JICA has increased network coordination between and within Japanese ministries and affiliated agencies, such as JICA’s network of 34 offices with JETRO’s six overseas offices (Côte d’ Ivoire, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa) has increased TICAD network in Africa. From the perspective of attempting to develop African markets and supporting sustainable growth of the African economy, JETRO (2013: 6) intends to strengthen networks of its offices and also its partnership with the African Diplomatic Corps (ADC) to facilitate business enhancement (ibidem).

Also, JBIC has expanded the number of missions to support Japanese companies, including SMEs, and JOGMEC began exploring potential of mineral resource export to Japan in 2011 and 2012 (JICA 2013). In contrast, Chinese imports from Africa increased fourfold between 2002 and 2005 while exports to Africa tripled to $18.6 billion or 6.3 percent of Africa’s global trade (WTO 2006: 10). In contrast to Japan’s trade with Africa China’s trade is highly complementarily, as more than 90 per cent of Chinese exports are manufactured goods while more than 90 per cent of its imports from Africa consist of primary products (ibidem). This is a problem, as state revenues do not benefit the poorest sections of society (Enterplan 2005). By contrast, African exports to India are much more diversified and labour intensive than those to China.
4. TICAD AND JICA: OVERCOMING DECISION-MAKING CONSTRAINTS TOWARDS AID NETWORK AND NETWORK COOPERATION BEYOND THE MDGs

The ownership of TICAD has grown throughout the years. The involvement of African countries in TICAD decision-making process and the ongoing discussions between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) and JICA has resulted in the accumulation of experience on both sides of the partnership (JICA 2014a). However, until TICAD III (2003) JICA’s lack of implementation power in the field; also the small ODA budget to expand aid-network explains the overall weak ownership of TICAD, as the process was more political rather than development. Several factors contributed to broaden JICA’s ownership as the implementing agency in the process and consequently in TICAD as a whole.

On the international front the OAU Summit, held in Lusaka in 2001, approved the New Partnership for African Development (then New African Initiative – NAI), which centres on African ownership and management, with poverty reduction as the core purpose of its programme (Rukato 2010: 96). The UN General Assembly in 2002 and TICAD in 2003 endorsed the NEPAD Agenda that centres on African ownership and management. Further, in 2006 the African Diplomat Corps (ADC), which gathers all diplomats accredited in Tokyo formed a TICAD IV Committee (ADC-TICAD) (Yamada 2011), increasing further the ownership of African countries in TICAD (Ampiah 2012). Following TICAD IV (2008) the establishment of a Follow-up Mechanism (FUM) with a secretariat inside of MOFA, and the inclusion of African Union Commission (AU) as a co-organizer of TICAD in 2012 has further strengthened the international network of TICAD Process. Finally, the “reborn” of JICA that was reorganized into an incorporated administrative agency in 2003 and became
independent in 2008 deepened the social approach in TICAD accordingly with DAC values and its own vision of “Inclusive and Dynamic Development”. Eventually, after TICAD IV (2008) this turned a problem to TICAD and JICA given Ogata’s past experience in the UN focused its assistance towards helping Africa achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) rather than trade and investment (Yamada 2015).

The choice between “more profits vs. less poverty” became a second problem to TICAD when Mrs. Ogata assumed the leadership of JICA as a major realignment was already taking place in the World. From the perspective of developing (and African) countries the OECD/DAC welfare aid model no longer represented the most interesting approach for countries seeking more prosperity rather than poverty alleviation itself (Eggen and Roland 2014: 85). Also, Japanese business community before and after TICAD IV (2008) asked Japanese government to provide ODA for infrastructure and human resource development to support the business activities of Japanese private companies (MOFA/METI 2008). Yet, Ogata international and domestic credibility suit MOFA’s foreign policy, the NGOs that assisted to an increase of aid through its Grant Aid for Japanese NGOs’s Projects. Figure 1 below shows that although the amount varies each fiscal year, it is increasing on the whole particular after 2003.
Mrs. Ogata also suited MOFA’s diplomacy to comply with DAC norm of aid for altruistic reasons. Arguably, the rationale behind MOFA to invite Ogata to head JICA is that Ogata’s inherent humanitarianism to alleviate the suffering of human beings by saving lives and assisting victims in post-conflict situations as formerly UNHCR matched perfectly the design of TICAD in which human security was an effective means to address development and empower the most vulnerable. After the organizational reform of JICA in 2008, the Agency ‘top down’ bureaucracy diminished toward a ‘bottom-up’ approach as the agency acquired fully implementation capability in which grants, loans and technical cooperation were brought together in an integrated manner. A JICA (2014a) official of the Africa Department confirmed us that the reorganization of JICA by MOFA strengthened the “bottom-up organization” of the agency to implement aid at the field.
Furthermore, the ODA Charter of 2003 also elected SSC as a modality of partnership with developing countries, and “human security the key to address the threats that individuals and communities face in their daily lives to support target communities in strengthening their resilience to those threats” (Hubbard and Suzuki 2008: 16).

JICA quickly adopted the concept in her Mid-term Plan (covering the period from October 2003 to March 2007), underscored by TICAD since its inception. In 2014, an example of the application of human security is Japan “African Village Initiative” (AVI) Project in Tanzania, Uganda and Malawi to promote agricultural development and self-sufficiency of local communities. However, the Embassies of Japan and the JICA offices in the relevant countries were not mandated to directly administer or supervise the progress of the projects as Japan’s assistance is provided through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) (MOFA 2014). Hence, Japan should proactively follow the outcomes of the projects and request feedback in order to increase poverty reduction spill over to outside; to be recognized by the governments and local communities of these countries, and to create direct diplomatic impacts for the countries where the AVI are implemented (ibidem).

Nonetheless, from TICAD IV to V the influence of JICA grew and MOFA’s trust in Ogata was also very useful to make of JICA an Agency with higher influence within the TICAD Process (JICA Interview 2014). JICA has conscience that the ODA name itself is losing expression because of emerging powers. In contrast to late 1990s and early 2000s when Japanese aid was provided mostly to social infrastructures and services with a growing focus on MDGs, presently Japan now in line with TICAD V focuses on providing aid for infrastructure and trade initiatives (JICA 2013: 134). As a result, JICA human resources network in Africa in the area of trade have increased from 68 in 2008 to 128 in 2009. In 2010
JICA accepted 1,848 personnel for training course, thus exceeding the initial target number of 900 people (JICA 2013: 5-11).

The New Development Cooperation Charter of Japan issued in 2015 points out in this direction. However, TICAD will continue to pursue sustainable development cooperation as a goal, which is or will be complementary to other aid instruments from emergent powers (JICA Interview 2014a). Although the TICAD and FOCAC have opposing and even competing modes of multilateral cooperation with its own version of partnership (Osei-Hwedie 2015: 136); it does not mean that they cannot learn from each other and cooperate toward the same end.

**Cooperation between China, Japan and Korea**

According with a JICA officer (2014) what hinders cooperation between Japan and China is political and not development reasons. It’s important to remember that Japan and Korea are members of DAC while China and India are not. JICA admits that not only they should learn through China’s development approach, which is faster and less expensive than Japanese approach, but also they want to cooperate with China whenever the situation permits to do so (*ibidem*). Examples of network between Asian partnerships are the cooperation between Japan and Korea in implementing the extension of the Olkaria geothermal plant in Kenya as a complement to China’s Exim concessional loan of Olkaria I (cit in. Raposo 2014). To increase cooperation the governments of Japan, China and South Korea established the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul in 2011. This “desk” cooperation has been extended to the field with existing cooperation between the three countries with Japan initiating a rain-fed lowland rice-farming project then irrigated by China and Korea (Kitano 2012). In 2009 and 2010, Mozambique JICA and Korea Eximbank began
implementing two projects - the Nacala corridor project and the Tanzanian Iringa-Shinyanga transmission line project with the African Development Fund (Raposo 2014: 121).

Cooperation between TICAD and NGOs

According with Ohno (2014) Japan’s aid network can extend further to include Japanese local governments that support SME development, NGOs and other actors who wish to join TICAD efforts in the field. Although the majority of Japanese NGO assistance concentrates in the Asian region with 80 percent, in 2011 25 percent of all Japanese NGO assistance was disbursed to Africa (Kenya with 22 percent, followed by Sudan with 20 percent and Zambia with 16 per cent) in sectors such as human resource development, life support, disaster relief, and community building (JICA 2013). With the majority of NGO assistance geared toward Asia one wonder what prevents further cooperation between JICA and NGOs to Africa. According to our interviewee at JICA (2014) before TICAD V there were five meetings between MOFA and NGOs. However, the lack of consensus between African NGOs on the one hand, and their long program on the other hand, prevents deeper cooperation between both networks. Another problem pointed by JICA official (2014a) is the opinion gap between civil society as a whole and who lead the civil society network. As our interviewees emphasize criticize other emergent donors is no longer important as they are becoming stronger in the development industry.

Changes in ODA landscape: implications for TICAD future

In addition, the definition of ODA is under review and there is a tendency to shift to more economic growth rather than social development. This change can be dangerous as can undermine even more African ownership and of TICAD as well. Another direction is an
international worldwide shift towards trade investment oriented development. Here the civil society not only in Japan but also in the UK disagrees with it and there are signs of anxiety over this shift. Independently of the direction of development assistance or development cooperation, JICA has neither given up at engaging civil society in TICAD nor on TICAD itself. Asked about what would happen to Japanese diplomacy if TICAD ended, our interviewees replied us if that happen it would be a big change, but they are confident that will not happen, for the following reasons.

Towards the post-MDG 2015 development agenda

Presently, the new mood of development made in Africa that is Africa ownership evolved along the TICAD process throughout more than 20 years. The influence of TICAD in international development is not valued as for example about 70 percent of the thinking in the post-MDG 2015-development agenda has resulted in great part of a common position discussed between African leaders and TICAD co-organisers. A common point reached between all TICAD co-organizers preparing the post-MDG Sustainable Development Agenda was about what kind of growth does Africa want? In the sense that “Growth” must be “Sustainable”, that is “Qualitative Growth” and not “Exploitive Growth”. However, there still left 30 percent to reach a global common position where all donors (DAC and non-DAC) can speak and be heard. This is the sort of interaction Japan wants with Brazil, China, India and Korea because they said they wanted to learn through TICAD. Now, China and Korea also have their ownership in their development partnerships and JICA welcomes and congratulates all donors that have graduated from recipient to donor with Japan’s development assistance. Hence, when possible Japan wants to engage with China or any other donor (JICA 2014).
CONCLUSION

In this paper, we attempted to answer what were the implications of TICAD normative principles for DAC aid model, for African “happiness”, for Asian donors and for JICA in understanding whether TICAD has changed them or instead was changed by them. Furthermore, it also examined the measures JICA is taking to increasing TICAD aid network in order to find a way to compete with other Asian partnerships. Finally, it also examined the constraints that hinder cooperation-based network between TICAD and other Southern partnerships.

Our findings show that TICAD norms and development inputs toward Africa have influenced not only other Asian partnerships, but also the DAC as well. It is also evident that the re-emergence of Asian donors changed the aid paradigm, as we knew it before. But, there is increasing tension due to the different normative aid used by DAC donors and non-DAC donors. There is also tension among DAC donors as Japanese and Korean aid models are closed to the Chinese and India models rather than the DAC, which they are members. However, in terms of Japan’s normative principles, values and aid practices, TICAD is losing its charisma built throughout the several conferences because the development agenda of FOCAC, IAF and also KAF gradually converged with that of TICAD. The Busan Consensus and its acceptance of a complementary role of South-South development partnerships aside of North-South cooperation, provides China and India legitimacy to influence the shaping of the international aid regime. In terms of South-South Cooperation India-Africa Forum (IAF) is closer to TICAD SSC as in addition to the general objective of contributing to the development of other developing countries it opens triangular cooperation with DAC donors.
Another finding is that although the IAF is less effective than FOCAC in terms of economic cooperation, it can adopt a similar strategy to that of KAF, which is to exploit the limits of the Chinese development model in terms of resource diplomacy, disregard of human rights and exclusion of civil society in state-to-state business. Hence, it is important that Africa reviews its overly trusting approach with China as presently China-Africa relationship is tilting to Beijing side. Maybe Africa should sacrifice short-term profits toward long-term sustainable gains.

The Korean aid pattern and KAF partnership contrast to TICAD in its selective approach and indifference for DAC aid allocation criteria. In addition, KAF shares with China the use of SOEs as a driver to gain access to Africa’s natural resources and infrastructure projects thus is testing the limits of its membership of DAC within Chinese model. KAF challenges TICAD because Korea unlike Japan has no qualm about placing more emphasis on loans and infrastructure building in its aid assistance to African for its own benefit. Korea lags behind Japan, China and India, therefore it aligns its interests with African interests in a win-win partnership.

With regard to FOCAC Japan is assuming a similar strategy to that of China in the sense that JICA with JBIC and its affiliated agencies has given priority to programs and projects that benefit the private sector and investment assistance within TICAD V and its co-organisers. Nevertheless, TICAD must not forget how to balance ownership with partnership and turn TICAD into an inclusive process where civil society voice can be heard. As our interviews has told us, “in the past ten years, or more until mid-2000s, the TICAD Process was mostly directed to get diplomatic support from African countries. TICAD has delivered ODA very broadly to African countries. But, with TICAD V Japan is more focused not on satisfying everyone but in exploring the second principle of TICAD in a mutual
partnership. Therefore, it requires from JICA higher focus in countries with greater potential for economic development like Mozambique, but also in Eastern and Southern region along the Indian coast, from Kenya to South Africa, geographically closer to Japan and the Japanese business community” (JICA 2014). This is the way, Japan shall differentiate from other Asian partnerships within its own priorities and aid practices that allow space for cooperation, despite the political difficulties in this interaction, this paper showed that JICA is open and whenever possible it welcomes the engagement of China in a true spirit of partnership. Finally, the concept of human security provides TICAD normative legitimacy and implementing advantages over other development partnerships as a key policy shift to empower and drive African communities towards the Post-2015 era.
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